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A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT FOR
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE CASES
INTRODUCTION
This note deals with the problems raised when police, by means of
electronic listening devices, overhear incriminating conversations and
seek to use a record of these as evidence against the participants.
In the constitutional area, these problems have been decided on the
basis of whether or not there was a physical trespass.' The question
to be examined here will be whether this test alone will give a satisfac-
tory answer to future problems in the area and whether it is the only
test justified by constitutional precedent. To do this the electronic sur-
veillance problem must be examined from the standpoint of basic theory
regarding the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Con-
stitution. The present test of trespass stands on the basis of the relation-
ship between these two Amendments,2 the logic of the cases being that
a compulsive process by which a man is made to testify against himself
may make the manner of obtaining the evidence an illegal search and
seizure.3 This has been further expanded to admissions gained by
stealth.4 The conclusion that the only fact which need be examined
is access to the listening post 5 is not the only one which can be drawn
from these cases.
If persons commit illegal acts in private places, the police, even with-
out a warrant, may still have certain means of gathering evidence of
these acts beyond a mere examination of the scene after the acts have
occurred. The means considered herein will be: police observation of
a house, of a room or of a suspect,6 planting an informer with record-
ing devices on his person in the private area," and planting an electronic
1. Olhnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927); Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S., 129 (1942); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
2. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) citing Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1885); Olhmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927) citing Boyd v.
United States, supra and Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). Both Boyd v.
United States, supra and Gouled v. United States, supra, being the leading precedents
on the historic relationship of the Fourth and Fifth amendments.
3. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 at 631-633 (1885).
4. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 at 305 (1921).
5. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. at 753.
6. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (a permissible practice); United States
v. Comb, 203 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Ark. 1962).
7. On Lee v. United States, supra note 2.
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listening device." These are all related, for all are attempts to put the
police in such a situation as to be "present" in these private places.
From these three methods evidence will be gathered to convict the sus-
pect.
POLICE OBSERVATION
Police and law enforcement officials become aware of crime either
through the reports of citizens or from their own observations. It has
been decided that they may not enter homes to observe what occurs
to determine if a crime has been committed, but a lesser intrusion has
been sanctioned; even though there may be an actual trespass, officers
may still testify as to their observations. 9 An observation by a policeman
of a person's private effects may or may not be a search, depending on
the status of the officer making the observation. In situations where
the officer is merely at the front door of a private home in order to
make inquiries, his observations, while there, have been held not to be
a search.' In a recent case, officers who stepped just inside an apartment
doorway were permitted to testify as to what they observed in the
apartment. The officers were compared to the "legitimate business"
callers any householder would receive during the day."- So it may be
concluded that officers who observe that which is public or may be
seen by the public are not making a search.'"
This same comparison is also found in On Lee v. United States,'3
which stated, "the use of bifocals, field glasses or the telescope, to
magnify the object of a witness' version is not a forbidden search
8. Compare Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) with Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). (It may be a permissible practice).
9. Hester v. United States, supra note 6. Here officers without warrant, entered de-
fendant's land and made observations as to the events occurring outside defendant's
house. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). Here officers barged into
a rooming house and then observed the defendant through a door transom; held an
unlawful search. See also United States v. Sterling, 244 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Pa. 1965)
A simple trespass without more, will not invalidate an otherwise valid search and seizure.
Compare Brinlee v. State, 403 P2d 253 (Okla. 1965). On similar facts to Hester v. United
States, supra the court excluded the observations on the fact that the officers were
within the curtilege of the house.
10. Ellison v. United States, 206 F.2d 476 at 478 (CA.D.C. 1953). "If an officer sees
the fruits of crime lying freely exposed on a suspect's property, he is not required to
look the other way or to disregard the evidence his senses bring him:' United States
v. Comb, 203 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Ark. 1962).
11. United States v. Horton, 328 F.2d 132 at 135-136 (3rd Cir. 1964).
12. United States v. Williams, 314 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1963).
13. 343 U.S. 747 at 754 (1952).
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or seizure, even if they focus without his knowledge or consent upon
what one supposes to be private indiscretions." Still, the case, as yet
uncontradicted,'14 leaves open questions, especially the question of what
is open to public view.
Litigation of this point in recent California cases indicates the trend
of judicial thinking in this area. While it has been held that an open
window and sounds emanating through a door are available to the public
and therefore to police surveillance, 15 more secretive surveillance may
constitute a search. A frequent situation in which cases of police sur-
veillance arise is the policing of public restrooms for homosexual ac-
tivity. In Bielicki v. Superior Court,"' police observed the defendant
through a small pipe in the ceiling of a toilet stall in a public amuse-
ment park restroom. The court first characterized a search as an
"exploratory investigation or an invasion and quest, a looking or seek-
ing out." 17 With such a characterization it found that this type of
surveillance did constitute a search: "from that vantage point [police]
secretly observed activities of petitioners which no member of the pub-
lic could have seen." 18 It is significant that this court reached this
result without any consideration of the question of trespass or the ques-
tion of petitioners' standing to challenge the search. Emphasis in the
case was on the character of the place, its usual privacy and the means
by which the officers made the observation. ° In other situations the
same court has held secret spying devices to be an unconstitutional
search and seizure. In People v. Regalado,2 small holes drilled into
hotel room doors for the purpose of spying by police were held to be
14. The authority of On Lee v. United States, supra note 13 has been questioned in
recent years, although it is still the authority for many decisions in the area; See Lopez
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 at 444 (1963) Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion.
15. People v. Jefferson, 40 Cal. Rpt. 715 (1964); People v. Aguilar, 42 Cal. Rpt. 666
(1965).
16. 21 Cal. Rpt. 552 (1962).
17. Id., at 553-554.
18. Id., at 555.
19. Compare People v. Angevine, 262 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1965). Petitioner had no
standing to challenge the evidence, where it was seized from an automobile he was
driving, but was owned by another. "He did not prove his relationship nor is there
any proof in the record of what his status was or what rights he had to possession.' 262
N.Y.S.2d at 787.
20. See Britt v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. Rpt. 849 (1962); People v. Hensel, 43 Cal.
Rpt. 865 (1965). Here the acts took place in the open room of the resthouse, not in the
toilet stall; "although the officer was hidden, the defendant's conduct was in a place
open to the view by anyone entering the room." 43 Cal. Rpt. at 867, distinguishing
Bielicli and Britt.
21. 36 Cal. Rpt. 795 (1964).
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an unconstitutional device for searches. It had long been a usual prac-
tice for police to use this method to spy on all hotel rooms in high-
crime neighborhoods. The court in characterizing the observations as
searches relied on the fact that the existence of the holes were unknown
to any except the officers and, but for their use, the actions of the
victims could have been observed by no one outside the room. 22 The
state argued that the officers who used the devices had not drilled the
holes, but that they had been there for years and so available to the
public. The court rejected such a defense saying the question is not
one of trespass by drilling the holes.23
Thus the rule as to what extent the police may physically observe
the suspect's home remains unclear. A simple trespass may be allowed 4
but in other cases, the question of a trespass has not been held control-
ling,25 rather the extent to which the observation intrudes into the usual
privacy of the place where the defendant's admissions occur. Concepts
that are used in this area may be applied to situations of electronic
surveillance, for they are essentially the same "offense" against the de-
fendant. They are methods of obtaining admissions by means of trick-
ery, fraud or deception.
ENTRANCE BY MEANS OF INFORMERS
Stratagem is permissible in fighting crime.2" But if stratagem and
trickery are used to gain damaging admissions from the defendant, how
far may these methods be used without violating his Fifth Amendment
rights? Gouled v. United States,"' held that such a technique may
violate this constitutional right while Olhmstead v. United States 8 de-
cided how far this logic may be carried.
Trickery may be used to execute a warrant if it appears that the
suspect will resist.-" But it was said in Olhmstead that a stealthy en-
22. Id., at 797.
23. Ibid.
24. Cases cited supra note 9.
25. See svpra note 16.
26. Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879 (C.A.D.C. 1953), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
930; Coplon v. United Stares, 191 F.2d 749 (C.A.D.C. 1951), cert. denied, 342 US.. 926;
United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20 at 37 (6th Cir. 1965). "A surreptitious police effort
to get evidence was proper and could not be excluded from consideration." "Appellants
argue that the evidence was obtained by fraud and artifice. Even if true this would not
render it inadmissible." 349 F.2d at 38. In this case government agents were "planted"
in defendant's offices to gain evidence against him.
27. 255 US. 298 (1921).
28. 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
29. Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1959); Jones v. United States, 304
F.2d 381 (C.A.D.C. 1962).
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trance could become the equivalent to an entry by force.30 Thus, in
Fifth Amendment terms, an admission drawn from the defendant by
trickery and fraud may be the same as one drawn from him by force.
In Gouled the court looked to whether the defendant was made the
unwilling source of information."' On Lee said the defendant is not
such an unwilling source if his admissions were made to a federal in-
former posing as a confederate; emphasis here was put on the means of
access to the listening post.3 2 Lopez v. United States,33 although sus-
taining the government against the defendant's constitutional challenge,
has questioned the holding of On Lee and thus reduced its authority to
such an extent that a mere citation of On Lee is not a sufficient answer
to cases posed in this area.
Problems of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments often arise in federal
prosecutions for income tax fraud. These cases do give a rule con-
cerning trickery and fraud as to such rights of the defendant. In such
cases the defendant usually contends that he was deceived into thinking
that the revenue agents wished to examine his private records and ques-
tion him merely to determine his civil liability for taxes, not as part of
an investigation which aims at bringing fraud charges against him.
Most of these challenges have failed on the fact question,3 4 but in
United States v. Guerrina,35 where agents told the defendant that they
were only making a "routine investigation," when in actuality they
contemplated that criminal fraud charges might be brought, the court
sustained the challenge to the evidence so gathered, saying, "to allow
this . . . would be to encourage zealous and less scrupulous officers
and agents of law enforcement agencies.., by trick and artifice, to do
what could not be done in court proceeding, i.e., compel a defendant
to testify against himself." 6 So if a "defendant is induced by a mis-
understanding of the facts and circumstances to give testimony against
himself, that testimony was given in violation of his constitutional
rights." 7
Such a defense to the evidence may be made in situations where ad-
30. 277 U.S. at 463-464.
31. 255 U.S. at 306.
32. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
33. 373 U.S. 427 (1962).
34. United States v. Frank, 151 F. Supp. 864 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Biggs v. United States,
246 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 922; United States v. Manno, 118 F.
Supp. 511 (ND. Il. 1954).
35. 112 F. Supp. 126 (ED. Pa. 1953).
36. Id., at 130.
37. Id., at 131.
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missions are recorded by means of an informer. But in On Lee,"' the
Supreme Court in such a situation allowed the evidence to be used:
Petitioner relies on cases relating to the more common and clearly
distinguishable problems raised where tangible property is unlawfully
seized. Such unlawful seizure may violate the Fourth Amendment,
even though the entry itself was by subterfuge or fraud rather than
force. But such decisions are inapposite in the field of mechanical
or electronic devices designed to overhear or interrupt conversations,
at least where access to the listening post was not obtained by illegal
methods.39
This specific reasoning has remained uncontradicted. But in Lopez v.
United States,40 as we have seen before, the holding in On Lee was
almost destroyed as a controlling precedent. Chief Justice Warren's
concurring opinion in Lopez certainly gives cause for a reassessment
of the questions in this area, as do strong dissents in both On Lee and
Lopez.4' The Court has brought both this type of case and those of
electronic surveillance into the same line of reasoning. The damaging
statements are kept in despite the Fifth Amendment, because the state-
ments were voluntarily made, and then the only question remaining
is the manner of entrance.42
But these cases can be distinguished from cases of electronic surveil-
lance itself. An informer may testify as to what was said without the
aid of the recording device. The question of allowing the tape should,
38. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
39. Id., at 753.
40. 373 U.S. 427 (1962).
41. Chief Justice Warren in Lopez v. United States, supra note 40 at 444, states, "Thus
Chin Pog armed with the transmitter, engaged On Lee in conversation for the purpose
of eliciting admissions:' Justice Brennen, dissenting in Lopez v. United States, supra at
449, states, "If a person commits his secret thoughts to paper, there is no license for
the police to seize the paper; if a person communicates his secret thoughts verbally to
another, that is no license for the police to record the words."
42. Todisco v. United States, 298 F.2d 208 (9th Cir 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989,
Here on the authority of On Lee v. United States, supra note 38, the use of a tape
gotten by recording defendant's conversation by means of a recording device was upheld.
"In the eavesdropping area constitutional problems are usually couched in terms of
whether the conduct under scrutiny amounted to an unlawful search and seizure. The
answer in turn, in this area, is largely dependent upon whether the entry upon the
premises amounted to a trespass." 298 F.2d at 209-210. The question of the defendant's
Fifth Amendment objections was quicIdy dealth with on a showing that the statements
were voluntary, 298 F.2d at 212; See also Williams v. United States, 290 F.2d 451 (9th
Cir. 1961); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 US.
953; United States v. Beno, 333 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1964).
[Vol. 7:93
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
therefore, be made dependent on the admissibility of the informer's
testimony. Such testimony would be open to attack on other grounds,
in that it was obtained by an unfair appeal to kinship, friendship and
camaraderie.4  So the informer problem can be resolved on voluntari-
ness, a consideration which is general in all cases of damaging admis-
sions.' The means of gaining admissions by stealth and trickery, may
then be made the same as the gaining of such admissions by force. The
inquiry as to how access to the listening post was obtained should be
made fbr the purpose of determining voluntariness and not to examine
whether a trespass has occurred. The consideration of voluntariness
would also have application to cases where the listening device recorded
the conversation without the knowledge of any of the parties. It would
seem strange that such admissions would be less open to attack than in
cases of the use of informers.
ELECTRONIC LISTENING DEvicEs
The Fourth Amendment protects against the "seizure" of words as
well as of physical evidence.45 In cases where the recording device was
planted in a private home by a burglary or police entry, the Court has
clearly held there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Such a
situation existed in Irwine v. California,6 but the action involved state
officers and started in a state court, and the case was decided before
Mapp v. Ohio47 therefore, the court was unable to exclude the evi-
dence,48 though it said that "each of these repeated entries of petitioner's
home without a search warrant or other process was a trespass and
probably a burglary."4 9 The court further stated, "few police measures
have come to our attention that have more flagrantly, deliberately
and persistently violated the Fourth Amendment." 5 0 The question thus
resolved in cases of electronic surveillance is whether there was a
trespass which would bring the case within the Fourth Amendment.51
43. Chief Justice Warren concurring in Lopez v. United States, supra note 40 at 444.
44. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964).
45. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1961).
46. 347 U.S. 128 (1953).
47. 367 US. 643 (1961) (Previously the exclusionary rule of the United States Con-
stitution as to evidence which was a product of an unreasonable search and seizure
did not apply to the states).
48. Irwine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 at 132-137 (1953).
49. Id., at 132.
50. Ibid.
51. Even a warrant or a court order may not protect an eavesdropping by means of
1966]
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This reasoning was followed in subsequent cases of electronic eaves-
dropping. In Silverman v. United States,52 the use of a "spike mike"
was declared to be an unconstitutional device which invaded the de-
fendant's "constitutionally protected area." The device was stuck deep
into an adjoining wall so as to take advantage of the defendant's heating
pipes to hear a conversation in a private room. The basis for the de-
cision was the extent of the invasion of the device. The Court in
Silverman, however, would not base the intrusion of the listening
device on common law concepts of trespass: "in these circumstances
we need not pause to consider whether or not there was a technical
trespass under local property law . . . inherent Fourth Amendment
rights are not inevitably measured in terms of ancient niceties of tort
or real property law." - Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion, states
that the question should not turn upon the "nice distinctions" of the
equipment used, but rather "our sole concern should be with whether
the privacy of the home was invaded." 54 He points out that the in-
vasion in Silverman was no greater than that in Goldman v. United
States,55 where the evidence gathered by a device which merely attached
to a door was held admissible.
The physical limit drawn on the intrusion is further confused by the
Court in a per curiam decision in Clinton v. Virginia,56 based on the
Silverman precedent. The Virginia Court in Clinton v. Common-
wealth,57 with full knowledge of Silverman, found the device covered
instead by Goldman. The device was described thus: "Officer Beach
was asked if the instrument used was a spiked device and he replied,
'Yes sir; small device.' That was the only description given of it. The
uncontradicted evidence is that it was not driven into the wall, but was
'stuck in it.' 511 This was the characterization upon which the Supreme
Court of the United States thought to be covered by Silverman rather
than Goldman. Then must it be concluded that the constitutional rule
a trespass. See People v. Grossman, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1965). It was
held that an ex parte order permitting police to search by means of a listening device,
planted in defendant's garage was unlawful as a general warrant and a search for mere
evidence.
52. 365 US. 505 (1961).
53. id., at 511.
54. Id., at 513.
55. 316 US. 129 (1942).
56. 377 U.S. 158 (1964).
57. 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963).
58. 204 Va. at 281.
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is to be measured in quarters of 'inches? The lower federal courts
have interpreted the law on such a basis.59
The trespass test breaks down where the intrusion on the premises
is made on a defendant who has little possessory interest in them. In
United States v. Stone, 0 a recording device planted in a public phone
booth was deemed to be an illegal search when it enabled police to over-
hear defendant's phone calls. Though the booth was a public place,
the court still held there could be an intrusion into the defendant's
privacy.61 The court further stated, "electronic devices without physical
presence enables an intrusion on the air, light and sound waves of a
person's property as real as any physical trespass." 02 Seeing or hear-
ing, then, of private acts may be such a real intrusion; but we know
that an officer may look into a window or listen through a door, to
detect crime. If those acts are not considered searches, then there must
be a distinction apart from the manner of entry into the premises, for
light and sound waves are just as physical as plaster into which
listening devices are "stuck."
It may well be that the emphasis should be placed on the character
of the place where the acts occur, its usual privacy or the character
of the actual conversation. In Lanza v. New York,6 3 the Supreme Court
held that the use of an electronic listening device in the defendant's
jail cell was not prohibited, as the jail was not part of the defendant's
"constitutionally protected area." Such a decision seems to give the
rationale in Silverman strong support, but there may be in Lanza indica-
tions of another direction. Justice Douglas in his dissent states:
The tenor of the Court's wholly unnecessary comments is sufficiently
ominous to justify the strongest emphasis that of the abbreviated Court
of seven who participate in the decision, fewer than five will even
intimate views that the constitutional protections against invasion of
privacy do not operate for the benefit of persons-whether inmates or
visitors-inside a jail or that the petitioner lacks standing to challenge
secret electronic interception of his conversation because he has not
59. Compare United States v. Martin, 223 F. Supp. 104 (ED. La. 1963) and Cullins
v. Wainwright, 328 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964). In United States v. Martin, supra, the
court specifically rejected any test other than that of trespass.
60. 232 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Texas 1964).
61. In distinguishing this case from On Lee v. United States, supra note 38; Goldman
v. United States, supra note 55; and Olhmstead v. United States, supra note 30; the court
relied on the lack of a physical invasion in those cases.
62. 232 F. Supp. at 399.
63. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
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a sufficient possessory interest in the premises, or that the Fourth
Amendment cannot be applied to protect against testimonial compul-
sion imposed as a result of an unconstitutional search and seizure. 4
Thus the test of trespass into the defendant's constitutionally pro-
tected area is breaking down. The increasing tendancy of the Court
to expand the areas protected makes it difficult to see how the test of
a physical intrusion may be applied.' 5 Secondly, there is the test as to
what kind of trespass or invasion is proscribed; 66 the problem of analysis
of the device itself will become more difficult as the devices themselves
are improved and developed.67
Emphasis in the area would be better placed on testimonial com-
pulsion, rather than the entry. The means of entry is relevant, but only
as to the voluntariness of the admissions gained. It is because we should
want to determine, in Fifth Amendment terms, if the statement is vol-
untary, that the position of the listening device is questioned.
In cases dealing with the defendant's Fifth Amendment objections
to these methods, the courts quickly dispose of the question. They
hold that in any case the statement was voluntarily made. 8 The only
way the Fifth Amendment arises is in connection with justification for
excluding evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure:
The defendant's statement to the officers now incriminating him,
even though it does not fall within the Fifth Amendment because
it does not come under the category of testimonial compulsion, a con-
cept which has broadened as has the 'security' of the Fourth. But how
did the officers find themselves in a position to see or hear the de-
fendant? The officers in the pursuance of a general investigation
entered the home under no color of right ... 69
64. Id., at 143, Justice Douglas with whom Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennen
join.
65. id., at 143. The majority recounts the extent given to a citizen's constitutionally
protected area.
66. Cf. text accompanying supra notes 56 and 57.
67. Olhmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 at 474 (1927), Justice Brandeis dissenting,
gives the consequences of development of new devices.
68. United States v. Williams, 314 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1963); In On Lee v. United
States, supra note 38, and Goldman v. United States, supra note 55, this is found. More
recent lower federal decisions go along with this view. See Todisco v. United States,
298 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989; United States v. Borgese, 235
F. Supp. 286 at 291 (S.D. N.Y. 1964).
69. Nueslein v. Dist. of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (C.A.D.C. 1940).
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Such a view of the subject has its origins in the reasoning in Boyd v.
United States.70 But in Boyd, we find not only the principle of the
relationship of the Fourth to the Fifth Amendment, but also the Fifth
as amplified by the Fourth:
For the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling
a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is-
condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man in criminal
cases to be a witness against himself, which is condemned in the
Fifth Amendment, throws light as to what is an unreasonable search
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.71
Thus the reasoning in electronic surveillance cases uses but one-
half of what is contained in Boyd.72 But Boyd also gives us a means
of determining what is testimonial compulsion from the viewpoint of
certain principles of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the manner in
which the admission was gathered does throw light on its voluntariness,
no matter whether it was gathered by a physical intrusion or not. The
test of voluntariness, then, is whether "he is the unwilling source of
the evidence" ;73 a factor determining this being the extent of the in-
trusion.
It cannot be contended that all police actions by which the defendant
is made the unwilling source of information are unlawful. In Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock,74 the general principle was laid down that "the privi-
lege is as broad as the mischief which it (the Fifth Amendment) seeks
to guard." 75 There are no compelling reasons why the privilege may
not be so drawn as to cover electronic eavesdropping if constitutional
reasoning may be so applied as to bring such situations within it.
In United States v. White,7" the Court stated that the purpose of the
Fifth Amendment was to prevent the use of legal process to force from
70. 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
71. Id., at 633.
72. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 at 646 (1960); Ker v. California, 374 US. 23 at
30-31 (1963); In Linkletter v. Walker, 85 S.Ct. 1731 at 1747 (1965), the court stated, "The
Boyd Court held that that Fifth Amendment's prohibition against self-incrimination gave
constitutional justification to exclusion of evidence obtained by an unlawful search and
seizure. The whole court treated such a search and seizure as compelling the person
whose property was thus taken to give evidence against himself.'
73. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 at 306 (1921).
74. 142 U.S. 547 (1891).
75. Id., at 562.
76. 322 U.S. 694 at 698 (1943).
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the lips of the defendant the evidence necessary to convict him. The
rule regarding the Fifth Amendment was recently spelled out in Malloy
v. Hogan,77 where the court extended "the right of a person to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own
free will." 78 A secretive entry just as much as a secretive eavesdropping
without entry, goes to the voluntariness of the defendant's statement.
If a new rule is to be drawn in the area of electronic surveillance, it
must be on the basis of the Fifth Amendment; but the full effect of the
Fifth must be qualified. The use of electronic devices only goes to
voluntariness, it does not proscribe voluntariness. 79  Intent to restrict
one's conversation may be a factor, 0 though not a determinative one.st
If at all, the intent of the defendant's admissions must be viewed ob-
jectively from the standpoint of the circumstances of the situation in
which the admissions are made.
CONCLUSION
Thus the possibilities presented regarding the use of police surveillance
remain unclear. The right of privacy in criminal cases is based on the
concepts of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as found in Boyd. 8 2 It is
on this right that the exclusionary rule has been applied to evidence
gained by electronic surveillance when there has been a physical in-
trusion. But this concept has been pushed so far as to be only an excuse
for holding evidence to be inadmissible where it appears that the de-
vice unfairly gained evidence against the defendant.8 3
A better rationale for cases of this type would be to use Boyd to
enable us to determine the voluntariness of the defendant's admission
by weighing the factor of the police intrusion, no matter what kind or
what extent. Thus the rule should not proscribe all intrusions but would
weigh the intrusion of the device with the usual privacy attached to
77. 378 US. 1 (1964).
78. Id., at 8; See also United States v. Guerrina, 112 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
79. This factor has been rejected by courts because its effect would be too sweeping.
United States v. Martin, 223 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. La. 1963).
80. See United States v. Horton, 328 F.2d 132 at 136 (3rd Cir. 1964). Here the court
took into consideration the time of day which federal officers came to the defendant's
doorway. At noon, the court concluded, a householder would expect, "legitimate busi-
ness callers." Also Caro v. Bingler, 242 F. Supp. 418 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
81. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 at 135 (1942), rejected intent of the
defendant to restrict his conversation to those in the room, as a test.
82. 116 US. 616 at 633 (1885).
83. Cf. text accompanying notes 56 and 57 supra.
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the place. 4 In this way a fair result may be reached which has a future
as devices become more sophisticated.
Thus if police by means of a long-range mike, were able to hear
statements made by persons in a private room, and from a distance
record the conversation, to be used as evidence against them, this in-
vasion could be weighed against the usual privacy of that room. The
smaller the invasion and the greater the availability of what is going
on in the room to the public, the more likely the admissions on Fifth
Amendment grounds can be held voluntary. Indiscriminate use of these
devices represents a great danger to any free society; if citizens are to
be protected from such invasions by police, then it is better that the
protection be based on a flexible rule of reason, rather than a standard
which measures constitutional rights by quarters of inches.
Allan Zaleski
84. Cases cited supra notes 16 and 20.
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